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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
On appeal, Ms. McLeod asserts that the district court erred when it overruled her
objection to the use of statements obtained from her in violation of the Fifth Amendment
at a probation violation hearing, which resulted in her probation being revoked and the
original sentence being executed without reduction.
In its Respondent's Brief, the State advances several arguments in favor of
affirming the district court's order revoking probation. Among those arguments are a
claim that the Fifth Amendment does not protect probationers from interrogation by law
enforcement, exclusion from probation violation hearings of statements taken in
violation of the Fifth Amendment is not a remedy that this Court should adopt, and
because one probation violation finding is not contested on appeal, the district court did
not err in revoking her probation. (Respondent's Brief, pp.11-14.)
This Reply Brief is necessary to address the State's arguments enumerated
above.

With respect to the State's other arguments, Ms. McLeod will rely on the

arguments set forth in her Appellant's Brief.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Ms. McLeod's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but
are incorporated herein by reference.
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ISSUES
1.

Does the Fifth Amendment protect probationers against interrogation by law
enforcement personnel?

2.

Is exclusion of statements taken in violation of the Fifth Amendment an
appropriate remedy in probation violation proceedings?

3.

If this Court vacates the violation for failing to obey all laws because it was based
on improperly admitted statements, may this Court otherwise affirm the district
court's order revoking probation based on the remaining violation?
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ARGUMENT
I.

The Fifth Amendment Protects Probationers Against Interrogation By Law Enforcement
Personnel

In its Respondent's Brief, the State argues,
The Fifth Amendment right to silence, however, is not "available to a
probationer" such that the state may compel answers to incriminating
questions in relation to probation violations "as long as it recognizes that
the required answers may not be used in a criminal proceeding."
Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420,435 n.7 (1984).
Probationers have fewer rights they can assert against governmental
intrusion than do other citizens. Probation officers can, and do, require
probationers to answer questions, on threat of probation violation, about
whether they are complying with the conditions of probation. The state
"may validly insist on answers to even incriminating questions" as part of
its probation system. Murphy, 465 U.S. at 435 n.7. Because McLeod did
not have a legal right against compelled self incrimination or to counsel in
relation to questions about whether she was in compliance with the terms
of probation, there can be no legal violation of her rights in the failure to
tell her she had such a right. See State v. Aldape, 794 P.2d 672 (Kan.
1990) (statements to probation officer about compliance with probation are
not incriminating under Fifth Amendment and therefore evidence of such
statements is admissible in probation violation proceedings regardless of
whether Miranda warnings were given).
(Respondent's Brief, pp.13-14.)
The main problem with the State's argument is that it concerns questioning
conducted by probation officers of their probationers pursuant to a state's administration
of its probation system.
statements at issue.

That is not the situation in which Ms. McLeod made the
Ms. McLeod was interrogated by an agent of the federal

government's Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency, not her probation officer.
Unlike the situation described in the footnote in Murphy, the interrogation of Ms. McLeod
was not conducted as part of the State's administration of its probation system. The

3

reasoning employed by the United States Supreme Court in Murphy does not deprive
Ms. McLeod of her Fifth Amendment rights when she is interviewed by someone other
than an agent of the probation department.

11.
Exclusion Of Statements Obtained In Violation Of The Fifth Amendment Is The
Appropriate Remedy In Probation Violation Proceedings
In its Respondent's Brief, the State argues,
[E]xclusion is inappropriate in probation violation proceedings. "Most
federal courts of appeal that have considered whether the exclusionary
rule should apply to probation revocation hearings have concluded that it
should not." Commonwealth v. Vincente, 540 N.E.2d 669, 671 ([Mass.]
1989) (citing United States v. Bazzano, 712 F.2d 826, 830 (3 rd Cir. 1983)
(and cases cited)). The reason for this is that reliable evidence should be
available to serve the purposes of probation and excluding reliable
evidence from probation proceedings will not serve the deterrent effect
behind the exclusionary rule. lfl (citing United States v. Winsett, 18 F.2d
51 (9 th Cir. 1975)).
(Respondent's Brief, p.14.)
The first problem with the State's argument is that, as the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts acknowledged in its opinion in Vincente, "the Federal cases we have
cited all involve evidence seized in violation of the probationer's Fourth Amendment
rights. Vincente has not argued that a different result is required under Federal law if
the evidence is obtained in violation of the Miranda [sic] warnings." Vincente, 540 N.E.
2d at 671-72 (footnote omitted).
Neither the Fifth Amendment nor its remedy (exclusion of statements) is the
same as the exclusionary rule that applies to violations of the Fourth Amendment. For
example, the United States Supreme Court has refused to apply the Fourth
Amendment's "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine to Miranda violations, and has
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explained, '"The exclusionary rule, . . . when utilized to effectuate the Fourth
Amendment, serves interests and policies that are distinct from those it serves under
the Fifth."' Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 304-07 (1985) (ellipsis in original) (quoting
Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 601 (1975)). It is clear that the exclusionary rule that

applies to statements obtained in violation of Miranda is not the same as the
exclusionary rule that applies to Fourth Amendment violations. The State's reliance on
a single Massachusetts case and its attempt to conflate the Fourth Amendment's
exclusionary rule with the Fifth Amendment's exclusionary rule is misplaced.

111.

If This Court Vacates The Violation For Failing To Obey All Laws Because It Was Based
On Improperly Admitted Statements, Then It Must Remand This Matter To The District
Court For A Redetermination Of Whether To Revoke Probation
In its Respondent's Brief, the State argues,
The state alleged that McLeod violated her probation by 1) failing to report
to probation and parole as instructed and 2) failing to obey all municipal,
county, state and federal laws by illegally re-entering into the United
States. (R., pp.130-31.) On appeal, McLeod does not contest the district
court's finding that she violated her probation by failing to report to
probation and parole as instructed. Nor were any of her statements to
Agent Rees used in proving this violation. Rather, she solely contests the
use of her statements to support the state's allegation that she committed
a crime by illegally re-entering the United States. However, because her
probation could be revoked for the violation that she failed to report to
probation as ordered, she has failed to show that the district court erred in
revoking her probation.
(Respondent's Brief, pp.11-12.)
Aside from the fact that the State provided no citation to authority for its argument
that this Court may affirm a revocation of probation despite concluding that one of the
violations relied upon was improperly found, its argument is contradicted by this Court's
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case law.

See State v. Blake, 133 Idaho 237, 243 (1999) (remanding matter for

redetermination of whether to revoke probation after one of two violations was vacated
on appeal).

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth in her Appellant's Brief, and in this Reply Brief,
Ms. McLeod respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's order
revoking her probation, and remand this matter for a new probation hearing at which her
statements to Agent Rees will not be considered.
DATED this 23 rd day of May, 2012.

S~E fER J. HAH
D1puty"'$tate Appellate Public Defender
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